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QUARTERLY SYNOPSIS OF
FLORIDA CASES*
ADMINIvATIVE LAw. Agricultural Commission. A fruit dealer's breach
of a contract to purchase oranges from a grower does not subject the dealer
to license suspension by the Agricultural Commission under a statute which
requires an accounting to the person with whom the transaction was made,
since no fruit was received for which to account.2
Ministerial duties. The Florida State Racing Commission annulled a
racing permit for failure to conduct a meet within twelve months from the
effective date of the Act of January 1st, 1935.3 The supreme court held the
commission's duty to be ministerial and the resolution became effective in
1936, twelve months immediately after the act.4
Power of administrative agency to challenge validity of act. Creatures
of the legislature may attack legislative acts only when it is clearly shown
that in carrying out the policy they may be injured.5
APPEAL AND ERRot. An order of the circuit court affirming a decision
and filed with the office of the Florida Industrial Commission, must be ap-
pealed from within sixty days or the supreme court has no jurisdiction to
hear the case.8
Findings of fact of the lower court will be disturbed only when shown
to be clearly erroneous.7
*This issue reviews the cases reported in 44 So.2d No, 5 (Apr. 6, 1950) through 47
So.2d No. 6 (Sept. 14, 1950).
Beginning with this issue, the Quarterly Synopsis will be written solely by student
members of the staff of the Miami Law Quarterly. The contributors to this number were:
Olive Mae Bean, Herman Bretan, Harvey Fishbein, Gerald Forman, Frank H. Getter,
Stephen F. Kessler Marshall Jay Langer, Robert L. Lewis, Richard W. Rodgers, Samuel
L. Saady and Clifiord B. Selwood, Jr.
The Editorial Board extends its sincere thanks to Messrs. John G. Stephenson I1,
Robert Meisenholder, and James A. Burnes, for their contributions to the Quarterly
Synopsis in the past.
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 596.11, 596.14 (1941) (repealed); See FLA. STAT. §§ 601.64,
601.67 (1949).
2. Mayo v. Lent, 45 So.2d 879 (1950).
3. Fla. Laws 1935, c. 17276.
e 4. Bourquardez v. Florida State Racing Comm'n, 45 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1950) (petition.er contended the commission was without authority to annul, since the act had been
omitted from the 1941 statutes, and was thus repealed).
5. Pensacola v. King, 47 So.2d 317 (Fla. 1950) (The Yellow Cab Co. of Pensacola
applied to the Florida Railroad and Utilities Commission for a certificate of public con-
venience to operate as a common carrier of- passengers. The city sought to restrain the
commission from hearing the application claiming it has the authority under the police
power. Fla Laws 1947. c. 24806 provides for such a certificate and gives powers to both.
Each challenges the validity of the act. The court held neither could challenge.).
6, Davis v. Combination Awning Corp., 47 So.2d 436 (Fla. 1950).
7. O'Connell v. Davis, 44 So.2d 811 (Fla. 1950).
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Where the supreme court has issued a mandate finally disposing of a
cause, a motion made for a recall-and for a rehearing after the close of the
term of court will not be granted because the court has lost jurisdiction.8
Certiorari. In two cases0 where an appeal was-the improper remedy the
court treated the appeal as a petition for certiorari under a statute. 10
Charges to jury. A charge to the jury upon an issue other than raised
by the declaration constitutes reversible error, since the jury is presumed to
have acted on the charge.1
Costs. Before an appeal may be taken by the plaintiff, under statute12
all costs rendered by the lower court must be paid. If they are not paid, the
court must grant the motion to dismiss the appeal.'
Instructions. A refusal to give an instruction will not warrant a reversal
if the law appears to have been fairly presented to the jury when considered
in the light of all other instructions.14
New trial. Statutory provisions for exceptions 15 to the rule that only
final judgments may be appealed'0 include an appeal from an order granting
a new trial," but not an appeal from an order denying a new trial.18
ATTACHMENT. Where the sale of an airplane is made to one to satisfy
the requirement of the federal law for foreign ferry flights, that person has
no claim on the plane in attachment proceedings. 19
BANKS AND BANKINC. A cashier's check which has been lost leaves a
bank the alternatives of either putting up an indemnity bond to cover the
loss or paying the money after the period of limitation has passed, since the
bank is liable on the check for five years. 20
BILS AND NoTEs. An issuing bank is not liable to the maker for cash-
ing a check on the order of the cashing bink which, having acquired the
check prior to the institution of the suit to restrain payment to the named
payee, became a holder in due course. 21
8. Pawley v. Pawley, 47 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1950).
9. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. King, 47 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1950); Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. v. United State Sugar Corp., 47 So.2d 513 (Fla. 1950).
10. FLA. STAT. § 59.45 (1919).
11. Henning v. Thompson, 45 So.2d 755 (Fla. 1950) (Plaintiff was injured by the
explosion of a Coca-Cola bottle and the declaration alleged the bottle had not been
properly inspected. The charge raised the issue of inspection alone).
12. FLA. STAT. § 59.09 (1949).
13. Keith v. Town of Stuart. 45 So.2d 493 (Fla. 1950).
14. Spanish v. State, 45 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1950).
15. FLA. STAT. §§ 59.03, 59.04, 59.05 (1949).
16. FLA. STAT. § 59.02.
17. FLA. STAT. § 59.04.
18. Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Insurance Agents Finance Corp., 46
So.2d 169 (Fla. 1950).
19. Mosby v. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 47 So.2d 291 (Fla. 1950).
20. Atlantic Natl. Bank of West Palm Beach v. Havens, 45 So.2d 342 (Fla. 1950)
Defendant bank had issued check to deceased and check could not be found after his
eath. His wife sues for the amount or asks that bank stop payment on check).
21. Riverside Bank v. Maia, 45 So.2d 678 (Fla. 1950) (issuing bank acted in good
faith in making inquiry, and followed tht rule that it is the duty of a party affected by an
injunction to apply to the court for modification of a decree in order to remove am.
biguity in meaning).
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Baonns. Instruments. Real estate brokers may not draw or fill in blank
forms of certain legal instruments. They are restricted to the drafting of
papers such as memoranda, deposit receipts, or contracts recording their
handiwork in real estate transactions. The best interest of the public may
thus served by the carrying out of the activities essential to the sale of land
by both the lawyer and the broker, each acting within his own sphere. 22
Fees. A broker who has been commissioned to find a buyer for real
property owned by a corporation is entitled to his fee as soon as he finds a
buyer who is ready, willing and able to buy the property, even though the
sale is made by a transfer of stock and not by deed.23
An administrator having the power to lease land for an estate may be
held liable for broker's fees. 24
CONSTrrrTIONAL LAW. Due process. Conviction of robbery was upheld
where accused were tried without benefit of counsel because they were
insolvent. The court held this not to be a violtion of due process since
they did not request counsel and were given adequate opportunity to meet
the accusation,?2
An ordinance restricting liquor licensees, other than those having night-
club permits, from using dance orchestras and other forms of entertainment
is arbitrary and unreasonable. The restrictions imposed fail to accomplish
the seeming purpose of cutting down noise since the use of artifical music
is allowed.26
Equal protection. The distinction between a municipality and other
corporations or persons is sufficient to prevent holding a statute uncon-
stitutionally discriminatory which provides for a shorter period of limitation
on actions against the municipal corporation for negligent injury.27
22. Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1950) (the dissent
contended that the applicable statute, FLA. STkT. § 475.01 (1949), gives a real estate
broker authority to complete and fill in the various forms)
23. Sunshine v. Golden Arms Apartments Corp., 47 So.2d I (Fla. 1950). A sub-
sidiary point decided in the case is that FEx. R..Civ. P. 26(d)(1) (authorizing the ad-
mission as evidence of a deposition of a party, who at the time of taking the deposition
was an officer, director, or managing agent of a corporation which is a party to the action)
applied to those directors of a corporation who had become trustees for purposes of dis-
solution, as provided by FLA. STAT. § 612.47 (1949), in order to settle corporate affairs
and prosecute and defend suits in the corporate name. .
24. Lyne v. Warriner, 44 So.2d 811 (Fla. 1950) (The realtor produced lessees
ready, able and willing to enter into a long term lease. The court drew an analogy to
Brickell V. McCaskill, 90 Fla. 441, 106 So. 470 (1925), in which attorney's fees were
allowed against the heirs of property, negotiations in connection with which had been
begun before death, and also against the executor for services begun and performed after
death. In the instant case, it appears that all negotiations mere instituted after death).
25. McAfee v. State, 46 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1950) FLA, STAT. § 909.21 (1949) re-
quires that courts appoint counsel for indigent defendants only in capital cases. It would
appear that the Sixth Amendment would apply only to federal courts, due process of law
in state courts being satisfied by an ample chance to defend the accusation.
26. Miami Beach v. Cohen, 47 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1950).
27. FLA. STAT. § 95.24(1) (1949). Martineau v. Daytona Beach, 47 So.2d 538
(Fla. 1950) (Plaintiff suffered damages from allegedly negligent operation of bus oper-
ated by. the city in a proprietary capacity. The action had been brought more than one
year after the injury was sustained, but within the time for such action had the defendant
been a private corporation). .
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There is no denial of equal protection under United States and Florida
Constitutions where equal accommodations are based on the number of
users.
2 8
Police power. A statute regulating the lease of private wires by public
utility companies"0 is within the police power of the state and does not
conflict with the federal commerce power.8 0
Taxation. The validity of the new "Sales Tax" law8' was challenged
in habeas corpus proceedings, by one charged with failing and refusing to
collect the excise taxes on temporary sleeping quarters, on the ground that
it violates state and federal constitutions. The court held there is no viola-
tion of these provisions.A'
CoNTEMPT. Proof. Constructive contempt of court must be proven
to the same degree of certainty as any other criminal case. The standard
of proof is not met by uncorroborated testimony of the sole witness for
the state which is denied and the denial corroborated.88
A contempt sentence based upon oral testimony in court, against an
answer under oath denying the motive but not the acts, was upheld in a
supreme court case of original jurisdiction as an inherent power of all
courts.
8 4
CoNTcs. Implied. A contract to furnish electricity does not give
rise to an implied duty to do so without interruption. Therefore, a purchaser
of electricity does not have a cause of action to recover damages for the
spoilage of meats in cold storage caused by an interruption of service. 5
Co uoxTIoNs. Dissolution. A corporation continues by statute8  for
a period of three years after dissolution for the purpose of defending and
prosecuting suits. A suit against the corporation may be instituted any time
28. Rice v. Arnold, 45 So.2d 195 (Fla. 1950) (one day of each week was set aside
for Negroes to use municipal golf course), judgment vacated without hearing by the
United States Supreme Court, as reported in the Miami Herald, Oct. 17, 1950, § B, p.1,
col. 7 and 8 on the basis of Sweatt v. Painter, 338 U.S. 865 (1950), 5 MuAmi L.Q.
P. 100 (1956).
29. FL. STAT. §§ 365.01.365.14 (1949).
30. U.S. CoNs?. Art. I, § 8(3), MeInerney v. Ervin, 46 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1950).
See 4 MIAMI L.Q. 515 (1950).
31. Fla. Laws 1949, c. 26319.
32. Gaulden v. Kirk, 47 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1950) (Clauses allegedly violated were:
FLA. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §§ 1, 12, 16, 17, 22; FLA. CoNsT. Art. II, Art Ill,§§ 1, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 30, Art. IV, § 8 Art. IX, §§ 6, 7, Art. XVI, §§ 2, 3, 4, 7, 11; U. S.
CoNsT. Art. 1, § 8, Art. IV, § 2; U.S. dONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1).
33. Marshall V. Clark, 45 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1950) (defendant accused of attempting
to influence veniremen in criminal case).
34. State ex. rel. Franks v. Clark, 46 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1950) (defendant had been
employed by counsel and had sounded out prospective jurors in an effort to corrupt thejury and influence the outcome of a murder trial). The court took notice of FLA. STAT.
; 38.22 (1949), apparently applicable, but declined to construe it since there is inherent
jurisdiction.
35. Bromer v. Florida Power & Light Co., 45 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1950) (the court
stated that there is only a duty to use reasonable care)
36. FLA. STAT. §§ 612.47, 612.50 (1949).
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during that period and need not be pending before the actual dissolution of
the corporation.87
Coss. In a suit for declaratory judgment to determine whether the
transaction under which the plaintiff had acquired property was a bona fide
sale within the provisions of lease, the plaintiff was required to pay the costs
of the proceedings even though the decree was favorable to him. The plain-
tiff had selected an uncommon method of transferring the property. 88
CouRTs. County judge. It was held by the supreme court that the
county judge was without jurisdiction to award a dower interest in land to
the widow. The Florida Constitution gives exclusive original jurisdiction
of actions involving titles and boundaries of real estate to the circuit court, 9
and gives to county judges the jurisdiction to discharge the duties usually
pertaining to courts of probate.40 This holding resulted despite a statute 1
providing that the county judge has plenary jurisdiction to assign dower.
The result seems to be that a widow's claim for dower is a third party claim
against the estate.42
CRImINAL LAw. Culpable negligence. In a case in which the accused
was charged with culpable negligence in driving an auto and, in a separate
count, with operating an auto while intoxicated, a reference to intoxicating
liquor in the indictment and in the charge of court was held not prejudicial,
even though the reference to liquor presented no element of the offense of
which the defendant was convicted. 4 '
Embezzlement. A statute provides that embezzlement is to be pun-
ished the same as larceny, which is either "petit" or "grand", the former in-
volving an amount less than $50.00. A jury instruction that if the amount
involved in an embezzlement was less than $50.00, the defendant was guilty
of "petit embezzlement", was not so prejudicial as to constitute reversible
error in the absence of an objection by the defendant. 44
False pretenses. Since it is common knowledge that the title of "Dr."
is used in many professions other than that of medicine, there must be
substantial evidence to show that an accused is guilty of the charge of using
37. Neville v. Leamington Hotel Corp., 47 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1950).
38. Silverman v, Rada Realty Co., 45 So.2d 758 (Fla. 1950) (the transaction in-
volved transfer of leased property to another corporation by means of purchase of lessor's
stock, dissolution of the corporation, organization of a new corporation, and a deed to it
of physical assets in exchange for stock).
39. FLA. CONT. Art. 5, § 11.
40. FLA. CONST. Art. 5, § 17.
41. Fr. STAT. § 733.12 (1949) (Fla. Probate Act).
42. In re Lawrence's Estate, 45 So.2d 344 (Fla. 1950) (the court explained that
among the beneficiaries the county judge has jurisdiction to deal with adverse claims to
real property, but as between the estate and third persons the determination of title can
be made only by the circuit court).
43. Taylor v. State, 46 So.2d 725 (Fla. 1950).
44. Chavers v. State, 45 So.2d 180 (Fla. 1950) (any words conveying to the jury
the meaning beyond a reasonable doubt are sufficient, and should be construed in favor
of upholding the verdict).
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the title prefixed to his name, for the purpose of implying that he is a
medical doctor, without first obtaining a license."
Habeas corpus. A recent statute46 allowing only twenty days for the
taking of an appeal by the State from a writ of habeas corpus was held to
repeal both a prior statute4 7 and a rule of court concerning the time allowed
for writ of error in habeas corpus.48
Homicide. When the judge included in his written charge definitions
in general terms of justifiable homicide and excusable homicide, but refused
an informal request of counsel for a charge as to self-defense, the charge
was held sufficient in the absence of submission to the court in writing of a
request for charges since counsel cannot place the burden of giving the law
to the jury on the judge. 9
Indictment and information. The evidence was held sufficient to sus-
tain a conviction of assault with intent to commit manslaughter under an
indictment for assault with intent to commit murder, since the lesser crime
is implied in the charge of the greater crime.50
Jury. A reversal was sought on the ground that the trial court had
erred in denying a motion for change of venue based on discrimination
against negroes in selecting the grand jury, only one negro having been
selected. The court found that there was no evidence to establish intentional
or systematic discrimination against negroes.51
Lewdness, The uncorroborated testimony of a 9 year old girl was held
sufficient to support a conviction for lewd, lasvicious and indecent assault
upon a child under 14 without intent to commit rape, no objection being
raised at the trial as to competency of the witness. The credibility of the
testimony was for the judge, jury trial having been waived.52
Motions. In denying a motion for severance on appeal from the joint
conviction of two defendants, the court ruled that as the burden of proving
error is on the appellants, the verdict of the jury will not be upset in the
absence of a showing of manifest error.5
Parole. A prisoner who overstays his parole must serve out the amount
of time remaining on his sentence when he ceased to be a parolee. 4
Presumptions. The dissent in a recent case pointed out that the instruc-
45. McMillon v. State, 45 So,2d 117 (Fla. 1950) (the court cited no cases, nor did
it spell out what would be substantial evidence in this type of case).
46. FLA, STAT. § 924.10 (1949).
47. FL. STAT. § 79.11 (1949).
48. Sweat v. Hixon, 45 So.2d 190 (Fla. 1950).
49. Foreman v. State, 17 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1950).
50. Walker v. State, 44 So.2d 814 (Fla. 1950). See Lassiter v. State, 98 Fla, 370,
123 So. 735 (1929) (the court recognized the existence of the separate offence of assault
with intent to commit manslaughter, but it was indicated that even in the absence of the
prior decision the result would have been the same).
51. She pherd v. State, 46 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1950).
52. Giulano v. State, 46 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1950).
53. King v. State, 47 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1950).
54. Sheppard v. Mayo, 46 So.2d 729 (Fla. 1950) (the sentence runs while a pris-
oner is lawfully out on parole).
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tions of the court placed the burden of proving innocence on the defendants,
thus depriving them of the presumption of innocence, and that an oppor-
tunity to make timely objection 5 was not given counsel.50
Robbery. The instruction which was given included the information
that the jury must find an intent to kill or maim in order to find defendants
guilty of armed robbery, so a further instruction that the value of the article
taken was immaterial was not erroneous when considered in connection with
the other instructions.57
Trial. Forty-five days was found to be a reasonable time in which to
prepare for trial."
Venue. Denial of a motion for change of venue is within the discre-
tion of the trial court, even when the Natjonal Guard has been called out
to quell mob violence stirred up in connection with the alleged crime. 9
CUSTODY. Determination of custody is strictly within the chancellor's
discretion and will be reversed, on appeal, only when there has been an abuse
of discretion.'0
DAMAGES. Exemplary. Instructions to the jury on the question of
exemplary damages were held to be harmless in an action for -conversion of
an auto. Since the amount of the verdict was approximately equivalent to
the value of the car, as proved by substantial evidence, there was no indi-
cation that the jury had been over-influenced by the charge.61
Punitive damages as well as damages for mental pain and suffering are
allowed for tortious interference with the surviving kin's right to possession
of dead body, as mental pain and anguish is a natural and probable conse-
quence. The act of the undertaker in embalming a child's body without
authority and holding it for a fee implied malice justifying exemplary or
punitive damages.'
New trial. No authority is vested in a circuit court to grant a motion
for a new trial on a question confined to damages, although the supreme
court may reverse for a new trial on a question of damages only. However,
since the supreme court may, by rule or order, authorize the circuit court to
do so,6o there is no error in the granting of a new trial when the procedure
would be wise."
DECLARATORY JuDMENTS. Attorneys. A declaratory judgment proceed-
55. FA. STAT. § 918.10 (1949).
56. Hatch v. State, 47 So.2d 433 (Fla. 1950) (the majority held there was no error
and that evidence sustained the verdict of the jury).
57. Driver v. State, 46 So.2d 718 (Fla. 1950).
58. Shepherd v. State, 46 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1950).
59. Shepherd v. State, 46 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1950).
60. Hastings v. Hastings, 45 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1950).
61. Thomas v. Parliament Loan Corp., 45 So.2d 750 (Fla. 1950) (defendant had
wilfully deprived plaintiff of the use of the car).
62. Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1950).
63. FLA. STAT. §§ 25.03, 25,47, 59.34 (1949).
64. Porter v. Gordon, 46 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1950).
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ing cannot be employed to ascertain the piocedurc for an attorney to follow
iii litigating a case..15
Dispute. A suit to determine whether a parish church was authorized
by its charter to enter into a contract to become a cathedral church, and
yet not lose some of its income under beneficiary trusts, is a dispute within the
Declaratory Judgments Act.6
Interest. A village had no interest to maintain a bill for a declaratory
decree as to the constitutionality of a statute67 contracting the illage's mu-
nicipal limits and relieving lands in the excluded territory from any tax
liens. There was no injury to personal or property rights involved, but
merely a creditor-debtor relationship between the village and those whom
it sought to protect.68
DIscovERY. Two cases narrowly construed the scope of discovery under
the new rules.69
DIvORCE. Alimony. An award by a divorce decree of a sum of money,
for the support of a wife and minor child, must show what portion is awarded
as alimony to the wife and what portion is awarded as support and main-
tenance of the child.70
A Cuban divorce decree rendered against a constructively served wife
on a cause of action recognized in Florida is a "divisible divorce" final as
to dower and divorce but not decisive as to alimony."'
Consummation. Whether sexual intercourse could not have amounted
to consummation, because of the use of contraceptives, was not raised by
the pleadings or the evidence and should not have been decided by the
master.72
Distribution of property. Property purchased by a husband and deeded
to the husband and wife jointly forms an estate by the entirety, and the pre-
sumption of law is that the transfer was intended as a gift to the wife.78
A decree ordering a husband to pay to his wife upon divorce one-half
65. Deen v. Weaver, 47 So.2d 539 (Fla. 1950) (whether or not one has a cause
of action must be determined by the case made in the pleadings).
66. FLA. STAT. §§ 87.01-87.13 (1949), Florida Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. St.
Johns Parish, 45 So.2d 751 (Fla. 1950).
67. Fla. Laws, Spec. Acts 1949, c. 26053.
68. North Bay Village v. Isle of Dreams Broadcasting Corp., 46 So.2d 496 (Fla.
1950).
69. Wofford v. Wofford, 47 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1950) (Fla. Equity Rule 49 does not
require the production of all books, documents and records or delivery of records en masse
to the opposite party, but only production for reasonable inspection and use in the trial
of a case); Miami Transit Co. v. Hurns, 46 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1950) (an order under Fla.
Common Law Rule 27, requiring adversary coamsel to produce names and addresses of
passengers and witnesses and any statements made by them concerning an accident, was
quashed due to the absence of a showing that witnesses were unavailable or that the data
would give clues to necessary facts not otherwise obtainable or that the data was to be
used for impeachment).
70. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 45 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1950).
71. Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1950).
72. Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 46 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1950) (husband sought to annul
marriage on grounds of fraud and failure by wife to consummate the marriage).
73. O'Connell v. O'Connell, 45 So.2d 882 (Fla. 1950).
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the value of their home, and ordering the wife to convey to her husband her
interest, was found to be contrary to a statute7' providing that, upon the
divorce of the owners of an estate by the entireties, it shall become a ten-
ancy in common75
Estoppel. Two cases determined that pre-marital knowledge of facts
constituting ground for annulment operated as an estoppel on the com-
plaining spouse.70
Foreign decree. A foreign alimony decree is entitled to full faith and
credit. in Florida as to past due payments, in the absence of any decision of
the foreign state indicating a power to modify the decree.77 "Every reason-
able implication must be resorted to against the existence of such power, in
the absence of clear language manifesting an intention to confer it."78
A New York divorce decree, awarding support money for children, is
not only entitled to full faith and credit as to arrearages, but it may be re-
duced to local judgment in Florida so that equitable remedies, including con-
tempt proceedings and actions on future installments, may be available."
Intemperance. All the evidence of the wife's intemperance was for a
period prior to the time that she obtained a separate maintenance decree,
more than ten years before, from the complainant. The court held "the
charge too remote on which to predicate a divorce .... 0
Review. The stability and finality of a divorce decree being important
to the proper administration of justice, a decree should be disturbed only on
a strong showing of fraud or coercion. 81
DECED-rS Es-rATs. Undue influence. The alleged declarations of a
testator, that he would devise all his property in a certain manner, are ad-
missible to establish that the will was in conflict with the intentions of
testator, in a proceeding to revoke probate of a will on the grounds of undue
influence, even though the same evidence is not admissible to enforce those
intentions.'2
ESTOPPEL. A municipality which allows a builder to act in reliance on
a building permit must show strong necessity for refusing to renew the per-
mit. 8
74, FLA. STAT. § 689.15 (1949).
75. Valentine v. Valentine, 45 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1950).
76. Blackshear v. ]lackshear, 45 So.2d 675 (Fla. 1950) (it was contended that the
wife was pregnant by another man at time of marriage to plaintiff); Gaylord v. Gaylord,
45 So.2d 507 (Fa. 1950) (husband challenged the validity of wife's prior divorce decree
from previous husband); see 3 MIAMi L.Q. 629 (1949).
77. Montell v. Montell, 46 So.2d 715 (Pa. 1950).
78. See Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 22 (1909) (cited in the instant case).
79. Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1950).
80. Acheson v. Acheson, 46 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1950).
81. Budd v. Tison. 47 Sol2d 12 (Fla. 1950) (the plaintiff appealed from a decree
dismissing her bill in the nature of a bill of review to set aside a divorce).
82. In re Burton's Estate, 45 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1950). It was contended that plaintiff's
testimony as to the declarations was inadmissible tinder the Dead Man's Statute, Fla. Stat.
§ 90.05 (1949).
83. Texas Co. v. Miami Springs, 44 So.2d 808 (Fla. 1950).
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EtQUITY. When equitable relief provides a more adequate remedy than
that at law, equity will take jurisdiction to cancel a contract for alleged mis-
representations. 84
EVIDENCE. Prior conviction. Evidence of a misdemeanor conviction,
prior to the passage of the act making a second violation of the liquor laws
a felony, is not admissible to prove the felony.8
Relevancy. It is not prejudicial to admit into evidence, in a trial for
forgery, a second allegedly forged check which is not in issue.86
Remoteness. Remoteness goes to the weight rather than to the admis-
sibilitv of evidence, unless it is so remote as to be deprived of value.87
EXCHANCES. Violation of a rule issued under the federal securities act
will void a contract entered into under authority of the act. 8 1 However,
violating a rule of fair dealing of a registered stock exchange will not void a
contract even though the rule is necessitated by the SEC requirements since
the provision of the act relating to violation of the rules "thereunder" refers
only to rules promulgated by the SEC under the chapter and not to rules
of an exchange approved by the SEC.t"
ExEcu'ro. :Execution of a judgment cannot be had after the twenty
year statute of limitationsi' has rin, unless a new action had been taken
on the judgment prior to the running of the statute. Supplementary pro-
ccedings' for the purposes of discovery of assets are not an action upon a
judgment so as to toll the statute of limitations.92
ExEcui ORS AMD AnMINISTRATORS. Executrix petitioned to reopen and
set aside a decree pro confesso entered against her in representative capacity
after service was made upon allegedly insane testator but none upon her
personally. The petition was granted since the judgment had been entered
after a hearing at which neither she nor counsel were presentY2
GUARmAN AND VARD. Since no statute authorizes a suit for divorce by
a guardian in behalf of an insane ward, the fight to maintain the suit must
remain strictly personal to the aggrieved spouse. A legally insane person,
being incapable of giving consent to a rational act, is precluded from con-
senting to a divorce. To hold otherwise would destroy the effect of the
doctrine of condonation.1 4
84. Regn'all v. Saylc, 45 So.2d 674 (Fla. 1950).
85. McKown v. State, 45 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1950).
86. Sinclair v. State, 46 So.2d 453 (Fla. 1950). This is an established exception in
forgery cases, within the doctrine of Coston v. State, 139 Fla. 250, 190 So. 520 (1939).
87, opkins v, McClure, 45 So.2d 656 (Fla. 1950).
88. 15 U.S.C, § 78 (h) (1946).
89. Ruspigliosi v. Clogher, 46 So.2d 170 (Ila, 1950) (Appellant, wife of appellee,
catered into a contract with appellee, an employee of a brokerage house, whereby appel-
lait would supply moncv for appellee's stock manipulations. When the appellant deserted,
an accounting was had wheleylv it was determined appellant owed appellee money. The
appellant contended the partnership was void because it violated the statute).
90. FLA, SrAT. § 95.11 (1949).
91, Fx. SrAT. §§ 5i.2,-53.61 (1949).
92. Yonng v. McKcnzie, 46 So.2d 184 (Fla. 1950).
93. lHarrison v. lanby, 45 So.2d 662 (Fla. 1950).
94. Scott v. Scott, 45 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1950).
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HAWKERS AND PEDDLERS. License. An employee of a licensed whole-
saler, who takes orders from and makes deliveries to retail dealers only, is
not a peddler. 8 Peddling, to be within the meaning of a municipal ordi-
nance requiring a license, is dealing directly with consumers,' The ordinance
does not conflict with the state statute97 forbidding the levying of a license
on the salesmen who operate delivery vehicles used by a licensed wholesaler.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. Since conspiracy to commit an act, which could
lawfully be committed by an individual, cannot be made an independent
wrong in the absence of a showing that the mere force of numbers, acting
in unison, exercised some peculiar power of coercion over the plaintiff which
an individual could not have done, and since the right of action for aliena-
tion of affections has been abolished in Florida, 8 a husband cannot bring
action against wife's uncle and aunt for conspiring to alienate her affections? 09
When the parties separated, they transferred their business property to
a corporation organized for the express purpose of carrying on the business
for the eqf'al benefit of the parties. Since their former home and business
property were owned after separation as tenancies in common, the mortgages
on both were ordered paid from the business income as a whole and not
from the husband's separate share of such income. 00
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION. Bill of particulars denoting time. The
defendant is entitled to a bill of particulars giving the exact date on which
he is alleged to have committed the offense, in order to properly defend him-
self.101 The prosecution cannot allege a certain day in the indictment, and
at the trial seek to prove the crime occurred sometime within a twenty day
period.102
Defective information. A conviction for forgery under a fatally de-
fective information was sustained, the detendant having asserted his righfs
for the first time in a motion for new trial.103
INSURANCE. Theft by employee. The coverage of an automobile in-
surance policy for loss caused by "theft" includes, unless it expressly ex-
cludes, the taking by an employee who had custody of the vehicle in the
course of his employment. An employee using the vehicle lacks the posses-
sion or the contractual obligation which are requisite for a bailment, under
the clause excluding loss due to conversion or embezzlement by a person in
lawful possession by a bailment lease. 10'
95. Surrency v. Sarasota, 45 So.2d 118 (Fla. 1950).
96. Hall v. State, 39 Fla. 637, 23 So, 119 (1897).
97, FLA. STAT. §Z05.59 (1949).
98. FLA, STAT. H 771.01-771.08 (1949).
99. Liappas v. Augoustis, 47 So.2d 582 (a. 1950).
100. Lamoureux v. Lamoureux, 44 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1950).
101. Thomas v. State, 74 Fla. 200, 76 So. 80 (1917).
102. Winslow v. State, 45 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1950).
103. Sinclair v. State, 46 So.2d 453 (Fla. 1950). The delay in filing the motion to
quash was deemed a waiver of all objections under FLA. STAT. § 906.06 (1949), which
provides for a waiver by failure to file a motion to quash prior to pleading to the infor-
mation.
104. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 45 So.Zd 499 (Fla. 1950).
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JuriEs. Disqualifibation. The performance of pre-trial ministerial acts
by a judge, who later disqualified himself from presiding over the trial, is-not
a ground for a new trial. 105
Ministerial acts. The drawing of the names of jurors, the issuance and
the return of a venire, and an order discharging men above the age for jury
duty, are ministerial acts.106
Ju DmENTs. Vacation. A judgment entered by fraud, mistake, collu-
sion or deceit is voidable and can be vacated by the court, even after the
expiration of the term in which it was rendered. The court rightfully va-
cated a judgment for the defendant which was obtained after the plaintiff
was given leave, without a specific time limit, to amend his declaration, but
before the amendment was filed. 107
LABOR LAw. Length of employment. A contract providing only for
collective bargaining and other employer - employee relations, and not for a
definite period of employment, does not deprive the employer of the right
to discharge an employee for good reason. Construing a pleading against
the pleader, in view of the failure to allege that the employee was unfairly
dismissed it will be assumed that the employer was justified in his action.108
Closed-shop picketing. Union picketing to induce the employer to enter
into a closed-shop contract is illegal under the "right to work" amendment
of the Florida Constitution.109 Picketing for an unlawful purpose is not
protected by the 1st and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion, and will be enjoined. 110
LANDLORD AND TENANT. Delay in construction. Construction of a
building in fulfillment of the lease was delayed by litigation which deter-
mined that a contract continued partly in effect although it had been
breached otherwise. The court ruled that additional time for completion
of the building should be allowed,1
LA Rcm. Fraud. The delivery of a certified check which was not vol-
untary, but was based solely on the fraudulent representation by the de-
fendant that he was an attorney capable of securing a full settlement of an
account, supports a conviction of larceny.11 2
LIBEL AND SLANDER. Privilege. An applicant for a loan from a loan
company stated that while he did not owe money to any other loan com-
panies, one other company contended that he did. The loan company to
which he applied, upon communicating with the defendant firm, was told
that the applicant was blacklisted. Even though the applicant invited in-
105. Driver v. State, 46 So.2d 718 (Fla. 1950).
106. Ibid.
107. State ex rel. Alfred E. Destin Co. v. Heffeman, 47 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1950),
108. Division No. 1344 of Amalgamated Assn'n v. Tampa Elec. Co., 47 So.2d 13
(Pla. 1950).
109. FLA. CONST. DECLARArION OF RIc-TS § 12.
110. Local Union No. 519 v. Robertson, 44 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1950).
111. Joseph Langner, Inc. v. Finston & Co., 45 So.2d 338 (Fla. 1950).
112. Knight v. State, 46 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1950).
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quiry, the allegation .that the information was not given in good faith over-
comes the privilege, and the declaration in slander states a cause of action." 3
The view of the dissenting opinion was that the invitation of inquiry made
the communication tantamount to one between the informing loan company
and the applicant, so there would not have been publication.'" However,
it does not seem that an invitation for one person to inquire is an invitation
for another to slander, at least in bad faith.
MANDAMUS. Discretionary acts. Mandamus does not lie to enforce an
act involving the exercise of discretion by an official, unless the property"t5
or bar license"8 zoning ordinance is shown to be invalid.
Issues of fact. An alternative writ of mandamus cannot be issued upon
a petition disclosing issues of fact which require the taking of evidence." 7
Right. The right which is sought to be enforced by mandamus must
have been established; so that an inchoate title, by reversion of dedicated
land, does not support issuance of the writ."18
MASTER AND SERVANT. Safe machinery. An employer is under a duty
to his servants, both to provide reasonably safe machinery and to exercise
reasonable precautions for the safe use of electricity in the place of work.
Accordingly a metal pole, which extended from the building and supported
power wires leading into it, should have been grounded in order to prevent
the leakage of electricity down the pole and across to machinery by which
an employee was injured.")
MEcHANc's LmNs. Clean hands. It was contended that the contractor
and the owner secretly agreed not to abide by the maximum cost proviso of
a contract, but there was no showing either that they intended to bilk the
mortgagee, who advanced most of the funds for construction, or that the
mortgagee would have been liable for the excess cost. The court stated that
the agreement would not bar a suit to foreclose the lien against the owner;
and the problem of priority between the mechanic's lien and tke mortgagee's
lien was not before the court. 120
Notice to owner. A general contractor must serve upon the owner a
sworn statement that all laborers and materialmen under the general contract
have been paid.'2 ' The important question of the effect of the statement
was decided in favor of the lienor, by a ruling that service of the statement
is not a condition precedent to acquisition of the lien. '22  Since the purpose
of the notice is to protect the owner against double payment, failure to serve
the statement gives the owner a right to withhold payment without default-
113. Caldwell v. Personal Finance Co. of St. Petersburg, 46 So.2d 726 (Ia. 1950).
114. Putnal v. Inman, 76 Fla. 553, 80 So. 316 (1918).
115. State ex tel. Office Realty Co. v. Ehinger, 46 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1950).
116. Somlyo v. Schott, 45 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1950).
117. State ex rel. Collinsv. Brooker, 46 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1950j.
118. Curtis v. Miami Beach, 46 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1950),
119. Callahan v. Bryce, 47 So.2d 517 (Fla. 1950).
120. Johnson v. Yaxley, 47 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1950).
121. FLA. STAT. § 84.04 (1949).
122. Hardee v. Richardson, 47 So.2d 520 (Fla. 1950),
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ing on the contract. In the same case, while the contractor did not give the
notice until after institution of the suit, more than 90 days after completion
of the contract, the complaint alleged that in all respects the lien law had
been complied with. If he had not alleged that the notice had been given,
the suit could have been dismissed for lack of equity128 or as being pre-
mature. 12' But, in view of the owner's general denial, the contractor could
serve the statement after beginning the suit and then amend the complaint,
to allege that it had been done, as a material fact occurring since the plead-
ing was filed.125
MORTGAGES. In an incisive opinion, the court held that, there being
sufficient evidence to support finding an instrument to be a mortgage and not
a deed, "once a mortgage always a mortgage.' 23
Deficiency decree. A deficiency decree is not an absolute right, but the
discretion of the court to award a sum less than the amount found to be due
must be exercised upon established equitable principles, and a reason should
be given. 27
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Bonds and revenue certificates. The con-
stitutional prohibition against the issuance of bonds, or other long-standing
indicia of indebtedness, without first submitting the issue to a vote of the
freeholders of the municipality,12 8 does not apply in cases where the pro-
posed securities provide against their holders looking to the general credit of
the municipality for redemption. Thus, bonds, the proceeds from the sale
of which are to be used for a properly authorized public purpose, which
pledge the net revenues from city owned utilities in payment,' 2' and revenue
certificates payable solely from revenues derived from an existing franchise
granted by a city' 80 are not objectionable on the grounds that they have not
been submitted to the freeholders of the municipality.
Boundaries. Street improvements, fire protection, garbage and trash
disposal, and prospects for other benefits are sufficient under the statute31
to justify denial of a request to exclude lands from corporate limits. 13 2
Competitive bids. The provision of a city charter requiring contracts of
certain classes to be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, after advertis-
ing for bids, is not mandatory. If a contract calls for personal services involv-
ing peculiar skill and ability it may be awarded to other than the lowest
bidder. The discretionary power vested in a public agency must not, how-
ever, be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously and must be based upon facts
reasonably tending to support the conclusions reached. It was found to be
123. Id. at 522.
124. Id. at 524.
125. FLA. STAT. §§ 63.27, 63.30 (1949).
126. Haworth v. Ricketts, 47 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1950).
127. Carlson v. Becker, 45 So.2d 116 (Fl2. 1950).
128. FLA. CONST. Art. IX, § 6.
129. State v. Bartow, 45 So.2d 886 (Fla. 1950).
130. State v. Pompano Beach, 47 So.2d 515 (Fia. 1950).
131. FLA. STAT. § 171.02 (1949).
132. Van Allen v, Ocean Ridge, 46 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1950).
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an abuse of this discretionary power for a city council to let a contract for
maintenance of its parking meters to one not the lowest bidder since no
peculiar skill was involved and no showing was made that consideration wnis
given to any special qualifications of the successful bidder.3 8
Contractual liability. A municipality is liable in an action of quantuin
meruit for services performed or property received under contracts not author-
ized by the civic charters.' 34 However, this liability is dependent upon an
actual benefit accruing to the municipality, and where the city neither ac-
cepts, uses, nor receives any benefits therefrom there is no liability."35
Meetings. The words "all meetings" in the statutory requirement that
all city council meetings should be open to the public'36 are interpreted to
mean formal assemblages of the council sitting as a governmental body for
the transaction of civic business. The court implied that committee meet-
ings are not within the purview of this statute. 37
Organization. Inhabitants of a community will normally be denied the
right to incorporate into a municipality two or more tracts of land which are
non-contiguous. 38 This restriction does not apply, however, where the break
in contiguity is due to an intervening parcel of state owned land which is
dedicated as a park and is a common meeting place of the citizens of the
community.3 9
Powers. The well -established principal, that where specifically enumer-
ated powers are granted by the legislature all powers except those enumerated
and others which necessarily flow from them are excluded, is used in con-
struing the recently enacted cigarette tax law as it applies to municipalities. 40
Funds realized from a municipally imposed tax on the sale of cigarettes can
only be used by the municipality for purposes which, except for the fact that
the municipality performs the function, would be state functions. Since
neither the state nor any county would normally construct and operate a
recreational pier outside of an incorporated municipality it lies beyond the
power of a municipality to use the funds realized from the special cigarette
tax for such a purpose.' 4'
A legislative grant to the people of a municipality, establishing in them
the power of the initiative, will be liberally construed to extend to all matters
of local concern not expressly or impliedly excluded. Since the state has
133. Pensacola v. Kirby, 47 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1950).
134. Webb v. Hillsborough County, 128 Fla. 471, 175 So. 874 (1947); Harwell
v. Hillsborough County, 11 Fla. 361, 149 So. 547 (1933).135. Knappcn v. Hialeah, 45 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1950).
136. FLA. STAT. § 165.22 (1949).
137. Turk v. Richard, 47 So.2d 543 (Fla. 1950).
138. Ocean Beach Heights v. Brovn-Crummer Inv. Co., 302 U.S. 614 (1938);
United States ex rel. Brown-Crummer Inv. Co. v. North Miami, 11 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.
F1a. 1932}; Winter Haven v. A. M. Klemm & Son, 132 Fla. 334, 181 So. 153 (1938);Leatherman v. Alta Cliff Co., 114 Fla. 305, 153 So. 845 (1934); Mahood v. State
ex rel. Davis, 101 Fla. 1254, 133 So. 90 (1931).
139. Hall v. State ex rel. Ervin, 46 So.2d 878 (Fla. 1950).
140. FLA. STAT. § 210.03 (1949).
141. Pensacola v. Fillingim, 46 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1950).
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granted to the City of Miami authority to do the things proposed" 2 and
the city's charter 143 provides for the initiative in terms broad enough to in-
chide the proposed ordinance, it is within the power of the city to submit an
ordinance providing for low cost housing and slum clearance project to a
vote of the people, whether or not the ordinance calls for administrative
acts.
1 4
Zoning. Zoning restrictions are subject to change or removal when the
reasons for them cease to exist or when changing conditions make it evident
that their enforcement would be contrary to public welfare. A zoning ord-
inance which has been in effect for fourteen years during which time numer-
ous and extensive physical, economic and social changes have taken place
in the community, and the repeal of which will not jeopardize the city's
zoning plan nor iniure any property owner, will be enjoined upon petition
of owners who will be greatly injured by its continued enforcement.'
NEGLIGENCE. Attractive nuisance. In a recent case the court found no
merit in a claim that the rainbow effect caused by jets of water being sprayed
into the air over the city reservoir was the proximate cause of the drowning
of an eight year old boy. It was ruled that the attractive niusance doctrine
would not be applied to create liability against the water company for the
boy's death."4
Common carrier. A cab company, in accepting an intoxicated person
as a passenger, does not assume the liability of an insurer to the extent that
it is obligated to keep the passenger under guard while a tire is being chang-
cd, but it is negligent in accepting the assistance of the intoxicated passenger
in the changing of a tire and becomes liable for damages for injuries suffered
by the passenger when struck by a passing car while so assisting.4 7
Contributory negligence. Failure to notice an improperly waxed floor
was determined not to be contributory negligence such as would bar recovery
of damages for injury received by one who falls as a result of the floor's
condition while using due care in walking over it."" The opposite result
was reached in the case of an automobile driver who looked only one way
down the railroad track before crossing it and was injured by a train coming
from the opposite direction) 49
Pleading. A declaration in negligence merely reciting that a property
owner knew, or should have known, of the hazardous condition of his yard
whereby the plaintiff, his guest, was injured is legally insufficient. A guest
must accept conditions as they are and the host becomes liable for injury
to his guest only when the latter could not reasonably be expected to take
142. Frt". SrAr. § 422.04 (1949).
143. City of Miami Charter, § 5.
144. Barnes v. Miami, 47 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1950).
145. Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., 45 So.2d 681 (Fla. 1950).
146. Ncwsby v. West Pain Beach Water Co., 47 So.2d 527 (Fig. 1950).
147. Swilley v. Economy Cab Co., 46 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1950).
148. First Fedcral Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wvlie, 46 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1950).
149. Atlantic Coast Line R.R, v. Price, 46 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1950).
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notice of the danger and it can be shown that the host had actual knowledge
of it.'50
Proximate cause. Where steers are negligently permitted to escape, the
negligence is not too remote from injuries caused by them the following day,
provided there is no independent and intervening cause producing the rc-
sult.'15
NEW TRIAL. Justice of the cause. A trial judge is duty bound to order
a new trial when, after hearing all the testimony, he has difficulty in recon-
ciling the justice of the cause with the iury's verdict and the weight of the
evidence.' 52
Misconduct of juror. A new trial for alleged misconduct of a juror will
be properly denied where the same allegation has been previously made at
the trial, the juror sworn and interrogated in the absence of the panel, the
charge found groundless, and counsel has consented to his return to thc
panel.158
PARENT AND CHILD, Custody. A change of exclusive custody of a child
from the parent granted the custody. in a final decree of divorce, to the other
parent, is a matter which rests in the sound judicial discretion of the Chancel-
lor.' 5 4
Facts gleaned from a dissenting opinion by justice Roberts show that
the court affirmed a decree awarding custody of an eight year old child to
the father, with visitation by the mother only at the child's request. 1'
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS. Masseurs. The operator of an electrically
powered mechanical device which vibrates, but does not rub, the body is
not a masseur within the statutory definiton. 56
PLEADING. Amendment. A declaration, amended at the trial, does not
state a new or different cause of action, so as to support a continuance based
upon surprise, when, in the trial court's discretion, the same evidence will
support a judgment given upon either declaration. 57
SALES. Implied warranty. The implied warranty of wholesomeness of
food products, sold in sealed packages or cans to a consumer, is not limitcd
150. Goldberg v. Straus, 45 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1950).
151. Loftin v. McCrainie, 47 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1950).
152. Trice v. Loftin, 47 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1950).
153. Loftin v. Conner, 45 So.2d 756 (Fla. 1950).
154. Smith v. Smith, 46 So.2d 711 (Fla. 1950); accord. Hastings v. [Hastings, 45
So.2d 115 (Fla. 1950).
155. Buchanan v. Buchanan, 45 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1950). The dissent considered
this holding as tantamount to a complete denial of visitation privileges to the m1ohliur,
contrary to the policy previously announced by the court in Randolph v. Randolph, 14-6
Fla. 491, 495, 1 So2d 480, 481 (1941).
156. FLA. STAT,. § 480.01 (1949), Florida Board of Massage v, Underwood, 45 So.
2d 184 (Fla. 1950).
157. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Edenfield, 45 So. 2d 204 (Fla 1950). Two otherjustices joined Thomas, 1. in dissenting on the basis that the change was material to the
extent that, had it not been allowed, "plaintiff would have been 'forced' to take a lion-
suit."
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to the liability of the manufacturer to the consumer, but includes the liability
of the retailer to the consumer.'58
SCHooLs AND SCHOOL DISTRICrs. Gubernatorial school board appointees
filling vacancies caused by resignation hold office for the entire unexpired
term, and not just until the election and qualification of a successor.15'
The court decided this in resolving an existing conflict arising from two prior
decisions 60 and conflicting constitutiona1 61 and statutory162 provisions.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. Warrants. Evidence taken from accused at the
time of his arrest for a felony is admissible at his trial, although the search
warrant was defective.?'8 The theory behind this holding is that no warrant
is necessary when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a felony
is being committed, making the insufficiency of the warrant "quite without
legal significance."' 6
A warrant authorizing search of a store for illegal whiskey is not suf-
ficient to enable officers to also search the accused's adjoining dwelling, hav-
ing a separate entrance and being separated from the store by a partition.65
STATUTES. Pari materia. It is a well established rule of statutory con-
struction that for two statutes to be regarded as in par matera, they must
have a common aim or purpose and must relate to the same object, subject,
thing or person, as determined by legislative intent.'"6
TAXATION. Board of Equalization. Two important recent decisions"'7
may appear at first blush to be in direct conflict with one another. They
may, however, be distinguished by the fact that one deals with real property
and the other with tangible personal property. As to the real property, a tax
assessor cannot refuse to act in accordance with an equalization of valuations
determined by a Board of Equalizers, even without a showing of discrimina-
tion.' 68 When dealing with tangible personal property, however, failure of
158. Sencer v. Carl's Markets, Inc., 45 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1950). The existence of
a sharp conflict of authority is clearly shown in the three opinions in this en Bane deci-
sion. The majority appears to have been swayed by the views of Professor Williston.
See 1 WILLISTON, SALEs 635 (Rev. ed. 1948); accord, Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore
Corp., 39 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1949); Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So.
2d 313 (1944). Hobson, J. concurred specially to emphasize his belief that the retailer
sho ld in turn be permitted to sue the manufacturer. Associate justice Tillman dissented
with a long string of authority and an opinion that the small grocer would be jeopardized
to the extent "of being run out of business."
159. in re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 46 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1950).
160. Compare Advisory Opinion to Governor, 154 Fla. 822,.19 So.2d 198 (1944),
with Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 159 Fla. 464, 31 So.2d 854 (1947).
161. FLA. CONST. ART. 18, § 6.
162. FLA. STAT. § 230.19 (1949).
163. Brown v. State, 46 So.2d 479 (Fla. 1950).
164. See 4 MIAMI L. Q. 519 (1950).
165. Dunnavant v. State, 46 So.2d 871 (Fla. 1950). For a discussion of similar
cases in the light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions, see 4 MIAMI L. Q.
519 (1950).
166. Singleon v. Larson, 46 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1950). FLA. STAT. § 625.14 (1949),
requiring dealers to carry liability insurance or to post a bond, is not in pari materia with
FLA. STAT. § 627.55 (1949), which regulates and licenses resident insurance agents.
167. Compare Sanders v. State ex rel. Shamrock Properties, Inc., 46 So.2d 491 (Fla.
1950), with Sanders v. Crapps, 45 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1950).
168. Sanders v. Crapps, 45 So.2d 484 (Fla, 1950).
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an owner to file a complete return under oath makes the equalization board's
reduction unlawful,16' and it need not be followed by the assessor.170
Intangible personal property. In a rather widely discussed recent opinion
the court declared the Class C Intangible Personal Property Tax'7- to be an
excise on the privilege of recording an instrument, 72 overturning previous
decisions to the effect that it was an ad valorem tax. 70
TAXATION. Statutory reduction of ad valorem taxes. In an action for a
declaratory judgment determining the statutory formula for computing ad
valorem tax reduction in a municipality which has imposed the special
cigarette tax as authorized by statute 7 4 the court ruled that only the taxes
actually received during the twelve months period ending on June 30th
could be used. This is true even though the municipality collected the tax
only during the last eight months of the twelve month period and a system
of computing the estimated tax for the full year would enable the municipal-
ity to authorize a greater reduction in the ad valorem tax rate.175
Tax deeds. It is apparently now established that recent statutory amend-
ments178 make mandatory and jurisdictional the mailing by a clerk of a copy
of a published notice of application for a tax deed to the owner or to the
party last paying taxes on the land. This must be done prior to the issuance
of the deed.1 "
The court has reiterated an established rule that the validity of a tax
deed is governed by the law in effect at the time the deed is issued. 7 '
A municipal tax deed, issued after a portion of the charged land had
been removed from the city boundaries, but based upon a certificate issued
when the land was within the boundaries, is valid.' 7 ' And, the description
in such a deed is sufficient although no township and range be mentioned,
if the section is given and there is only one section in that city having thai
number, technical accuracy being unnecessary.180
When nine years have elapsed since a public sale of lands pursuant to
169. FLA. STAT. § 193.27 (1949).
170. Sanders v. State ex. Tel. Shamrock Properties, Inc., 46 So.2d 491 (Fla. 1950).
171. FLA. STAT. §§ 199.02(3), 199.11(3) (1949).
172. State ex rel. United States Sugar Corp. v. Gay, 46 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1949);
accord, Smith v. Gay, 46 So.2d 169 (Fla. 1949). For a concise discussion of the prin-
cipal case, see 4 MIAMI L. Q. 404 (1950).
173. State ex rel. Seaboard Air Line R. R. v. Gay, 160 Fla. 445, 35 So,2d 403
(1948); State ex rel. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Gay, 40 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1949).
174. FLA. STAT, § 210.21 (1949).
175. Gay v. Coral Gables, 47 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1950).
176. FLA. STAT. §§ 194.18, 194.51 (1949), amended, Fla. Laws, 1943, c. 22079.
Prior to amendment these sections read "... failure of the clerk to mail the notice
or the failure of the owner , . . to receive such notice shall not affect the validity of the
tax deed ..... They now read "The failure of the ... owner . . . to receive such notice
shall not affect the sufficiency or validity of this requirement."
177. Heinberg v. Andress, 45 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1950) (holder under prior tax deed
was permitted to redeem outstanding certificate upon which new tax deed was issued
when no notice had been mailed by clerk prior to issuance of new deed); accord, Swigert
v. Parker, 46 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1950).
178. Heipberg v. Andress, 45 So.2d 488 (F2. 1950).
179. Townes v. Nowlin, 45 So.2d 346 (Fla, 1950).
180. ibid.
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a. final decree foreclosing outstanding tax certificates in a cause wherein a
decedent certificate holder failed to plead, the purchaser at the sale will suc-
ceed in a suit to cancel the tax certificates as against the executors of the
decedent. 181
TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION. Personal
name. A person cannot be prohibited from using his own name for a business
firm name, but there may be regulation to prevent its being used unfairly
or dishonestly for the purpose of pirating the good will and reputation of
a rival by passing off goods as those of the rival who gave the name its repu-
tation and value. In adhering to this genexal rule, three brothers who opened
a competitive business adjacent to the firm of another brother were enjoined
from taking a special listing in the classified telephone directory (of the tele-
phone company), because it gave them a preferential position in the list of
subscribers.18 2 Each firm name began with the same last name of the broth-
ers, and each listing indicated the type of business carried on, thus making
it impossible for an outsider to distinguish the companies.
TRIAL. Instructions to jury. Prejudicial error was not committed by an
instruction to the jury that a railroad company must provide employees with
a reasonably safe place in which to work, and must warn of any dangers of
which the railroad could obtain knowledge by reasonable diligence and
care.188 In another case,"8 4 the foreman of a confused jury having requested
instructions on comparative negligence, a failure to give such instructions did
not entitle the plaintiff to a new trial after the jury had entered a verdict for
the defendant.
Verdict. A jury verdict finding for a plaintiff and assessing damages at
"$0000" was upheld as showing the intent of the jury, the words "find for
the plaintiffs" being considered mere surplusage, at least in the absence of
an objection to the form of the verdict which was presented to the jury.1 5
Also, a directed verdict should not be granted by the trial court in the face
of disputes and conflicts in the evidence tending to prove the issues.186
VENDOR AND PURcHASER. Rescission. A vendor's false statement of the
amount of monthly rental of apartments, which were under OPA control,
was not such a misrepresentation of a material fact as would warrant rescis-
sion of the contract. 8 7 Purchasers are not relieved of the duty and respon-
sibility of an honest and thorough investigation of the statements of the
vendor, because the law recognizes the rights of a trader or dealer "to cry his
own wares." But this rule applies to expressions of opinion. Here there was
181. Campbell v. Pent, 46 So.2d 388 (Fla. 1950).
182. May v. May, 45 So.2d 494 (Fla. 1950).
183. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Haynes, 47 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1950).
184. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Mahlo, 45 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1950).
185. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Price, 46 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1950) (the case in-
volvvd four plaintiffs, only three of whom actually received damaegs).
186. Oppenheimer v. Werner, 46 So.2d 870 (Fla. 1950) (there was no conflict
as to what happened but there was a dispute whether negligence was involved).
187. Greenberg v. Berger, 46 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1950).
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no room for opinion, for the OPA price was an established fact. The doc-
trine of caveat emptor seems to be extended in this case.
Recordation. While an unrecorded conveyance of realty is not effective
against a subsequent purchaser for value without notice, and there is a pre-
sumption of lack of notice, the law may impute constructive notice from
possession which is open, visible and exclusive. Possession of land partly
covered by water, and unsuitable for farming, is not of assistance in deter-
mining constructive notice; and the prior purchaser who failed to record his
conveyance did not sustain the burden of proof that the subsequent ptir-
chaser had actual notice of the transfer.Sb
Sales. Where an infant who had held himself out as an adult and there-
by secured the purchase of a new car on a conditional sales contract, making
as a down payment thereon the value of an older car, and subsequently
paying one installment only and no more, he could not later interpose his
infancy to defeat the right of the vendor to replevy the chattel. The fraud
went to a material factor inducing the vendor to enter into the contract, and
the court will not allow the shield of infancy to be used to the injury of those
dealing in good faith.
18 9
VENUE. Two cases in the last quarter involving the Comptroller of the
State of Florida have turned largely upon the question of venue. In the
first, it was decided that the question, whether a state agency must be sued
in the county where the seat of government is located or may be sued in
another county, is one of venue and not of jurisdiction over the subject-mat-
ter of the litigation. A denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of venue,
brought under the new Equity Rule 33(b), did not make available to the
Comptroller the remedy of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from tak-
ing further action in the cause. 190 The second case set forth the general
rule that suits against an enforcement officer to test the legality of taxes
are maintainable only in the county of his official residence. Exceptions to
this rule, one, that the officer shall waive the point of venue, and two, that
"some attempt to seize and sell property to satisfy the disputed tax has been
actually initiated in the county where the suit is brought," did not arise. 19'
WATERS AND WATER COURSES. Riparian rights. All riparian owners
are entitled to equal use of a non-navigable lake. Hence the court affirmed
a permanent, injunction restraining the use of the water during any dry
season for irrigating citrus groves to the detriment of another riparian owner,
a coal company, which used the lake for the recreation of its employees and
officers.192
WrLLs. Probate. Under Florida statutes,193 it is not error to dismiss a
188. McCahill v. Travis Co,, 45 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1950).
189. Mossier Acceptance Corp. v. Perlman, 47 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1950).
190. Gay v. Ogilvie, 47 So.2d 525 (Fla. 1950).
191. Gaulden v. Gay, 47 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1950).
192. Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1950); see Tilden v. Smith, 94
Fla. 502, 113 So. 708 (1927); Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 20 So. 780
(1896 .%9m, Fi,. STAr. § 732.3 0 (1949).
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petition for revocation of probate of a will by a petitioner who is neither an
heir at law, a beneficiary under a former will, nor the personal representative
named in a former wil1.'" Nor is the affirmance of an order denying a
petition to revoke the probate of a will made improper by the fact that be-
jiiests under the will have not been paid. since neither the order nor the
affirmance determines the rights of beneficiaries as such. 195 Allegations of
facts showing a moral obligation of the testatrix to make a bequest and in-
tention to do so, and that the principal beneficiary of the will over-persuaded
the testatrix to transfer the property to him, are not sufficient grounds for
revoking probate of the will. because a county judge lacks jurisdiction to ad-
judicate transfers of property.' 0
Codicils. Lack of an express request by the testator for attesting wit-
nesses to subscribe to a codicil does not invalidate the will, because the statute
governing codicilsi 'r does not require an express request. The statute only
requires subscription by the testator in the presence of two attesting witnesses
present at the same tiniie.J
\VoHKNEN's CoxI'r-NsATION. Burden of proof. Since the presumption
is that the injured employec was in the course of employment when the in-
jury occurred, a claimant need prove only facts from which it may be reason-
ably inferred that such was the case. The employer has the burden of prov-
ing that the accident did not occur in the course of employment.'
Election. The acceptance of a settlement from the third party who
caused the injury constitutes an election and precludes the employee from
suing the employer under the Florida \Vorkmen's Compensation Act,200
even though the written agreement expressly reserves to the employee all
rights to proceed against any other person.20' All laws in effect in Florida
which affect the subject-matter of an agreement become a part thereof,
despite the parties' express intention to the contrary.
Measure of compensation. An injured employee who was employed on
a part-time basis only should be compensated on the basis of a full-time
employec, or what the job would pay were he a full-time employee, 202 and
not on a part-time pay basis. 20 3 Two judges dissented, claiming that the
applicable section of the statute applied only to a full-time worker and that
U part-time worker should be paid on the basis of what he earns.
Medical expenses. A voluntary payment of medical expenses, in excess
194. llopkins v. MeClurc. 45 So.2d 656 (Via. 1950).
195. Ibid,
196, Ibid.
197, IA. StAr. § 731.07 (1949).
198, Gair v. Lockhart, 45 So.2d 193 (1950).
199. Sanford v. A. P. Clark Motors, Inc., 45 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1950).
20. FLA. SiAl. § 440.39 (1949) (provides that injured employee may elect whether
tB accept compensation under the act or to pursue his remedy against third persons).
201. Saunders v. Cities Service Oil Co., 46 So.2d 597 (1950).
202. FLA. StrAT. § 440.14(3) provides that "the full time weekly wage of the em-
!,,'t'VC shall be used."
203. 'errin v. 'Iaimer Crocerv Cu.,,46 So.2d 886 (1950).
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of the maximum required by statute,20 waives the protective statute. The
commission may thereafter, on its own initiative or upon application of
any party in interest, order the employer or insurer to furnish such additional
treatment as the injury or convalescence may require.200
Persons covered. A part-time carpenter, helping to construct a small
bathroom at a summer camp, is not an employee within the context of the
Florida Workmen's Compensation Act.oeI- He is thereby permitted to Me-
cover for personal injuries arising out of the camp owner's negligence.2 07
Scope of review. The function of the Industrial Commission is to re-
solve the evidence presented to it, and unless its order is shown to be clearly
erroneous, it should be affirmed. Therefore, the circuit court should review
the order of the commission rather than the order of the deputy commis-
sioner where findings are not binding upon the commission 0.28
204. FLA. STAT. 440.13(3) (a) (1949). (The purpose of the provision limiting pay-
ments to $1,000 is to rotect the employer from fraudulent claims for additional medical
attentipn or 'from claims wherein additional medical attention might be unwarranted and
unnecessary).
20. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pinkerman, 47 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1950).
206. Fs.a. STAT. §§ 440.01-440.57 (1949).
207. Rogers v. Barrett, 46 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1950).
208. Sonny Boy's Fruit Co. v. Compton, 46 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1950).
